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SHAMING KINDERGARTENERS? CHANNELING
DRED SCOTT? FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
RIGHTS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Harry G. Hutchison'
I. INTRODUcTION
We live in a "contemporary moment [that] is marked by profound cul-
tural division."' Cultural separation may be sparked by an attempt to
restore religion and religious expression to their once prominent place in
2American discourse, or by countervailing root and branch efforts aimed
at removing all discomforting religious references from the public square.
In Kentucky, the state school board recently tackled a dispute over his-
torical date references initiated by a proposal to substitute "C.E. (Com-
mon Era) for A.D. and B.C.E. (Before Common Era) for B.C., 3 This
proposal was aimed at eliminating religious dates from classrooms.
Given the semiotics of this issue for disputants, the school board is ex-
pected to broker an inclusive solution that embraces both systems. In
another case, a federal district court denied a preliminary injunction
sought by a student organization that asserted a violation of its First
Amendment rights to freedom of expressive association and free speech
because the student organization insisted on enforcing a provision requir-
+ Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. For helpful com-
ments on earlier drafts, I am grateful to: Elizabeth McKay, Jane Barton, Richard Bowser,
Byron Cooper, John Dolan, Rick Garnett, Nelson Lund, Leon Lysaght, Robert Miller,
Richard Myers, Robert Nagel, James Ross, Ronald Rotunda, Robert Sedler, Robert
Vischer, and Gregory Wallace. My research was funded entirely by the Law & Economics
Center at George Mason University School of Law.
1. Andy Crouch, The Phone Book Test, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, June 2006, at 44,44
(interviewing Robert P. George). See generally ROBERT P. GEORGE, THE CLASH OF
ORTHODOXIES: LAW, RELIGION, AND MORALITY IN CRISIS (2001). Consistent with
George's intuition, San Francisco, a city long considered a beacon of tolerance and inclu-
sion, condemned 25,000 Christian teens rallying against pop culture's terrorism against
virtue. Joe Garofoli, Christian Youth Rally in S.F., S.F. CHRON., Mar. 25, 2006, at Al. The
demonstrators were, in the words of the resolution passed by the San Francisco Board of
Supervisors, engaged in an "'act of provocation"' aimed at "'negatively influence[ing] the
politics of America's most tolerant and progressive city."' Id.; see also Steven D. Smith,
Conciliating Hatred, FIRST THINGS, June-July 2004, at 17, 17-22.
2. James R. Stoner, Jr., Theology as Knowledge, FIRST THINGS, May 2006, at 21,21.
3. Michael Jennings, Kentucky Asks What Year Is It?, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, May
31, 2006, http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2006/mayweb-only/122-32.0.html.
4. Id.
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ing voting members to subscribe to its statement of faith, which the uni-
versity deemed exclusionary! In still another case, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit allowed a lawyer to strike jurors
from the jury pool on the basis of their religious beliefs. 6 The disputed
practices included teaching Sunday school, singing in the church choir,
and reading the Bible and related literature.! This exclusionary maneu-
ver amounts to "another victory for the liberalism of personal autonomy"
8as part of America's emerging constitutional jurisprudence.
Consistent with this move, Daniel Dennett maintains that the evolution
of religion reflects the stubborn persistence of a bad meme from which
inoculation and isolation are required.9 Accordingly, "parental teaching
of religion [should] be closely monitored and treated as a potential form
of child abuse."10 As thus understood, children under the influence of
parents who are infected with a religious meme are unlikely to live con-
sistently with John Dewey's worldview, wherein the concept of culture is
transformed "from a tool of analysis [in]to a resource for [unconstrained]
individual liberation"1 and singularity.12 This liberal worldview appears
to be of a piece with a line of thought wherein "religion is doubly discred-
ited, first by the casual assumption that it is outside the domain of reason,
and then by hostility to its unwelcome critiques of and constraints upon
'deep' desires" and cauterized preferences. 3 Consistent with this intui-
tion, religious expression should be seen as a mark of degradation. 14 It
follows that individuals and groups that are afflicted with the religious
meme should be excluded from discourse with a nation that is character-
5. Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter at S. Ill. Univ. Sch. of Law v. Walker, No. 05-4070-
GPM, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13881, at *1-4, *10 (S.D. I11. July 5, 2005) (order denying
preliminary injunction), rev'd, 453 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2006).
6. United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500, 510-11 (3d Cir. 2003).
7. Id. at 502; see also Robert T. Miller, A Jury of One's Godless Peers, FIRST
THINGS, Mar. 2004, at 11, 12-13 (discussing the facts and meaning of the DeJesus case).
8. Miller, supra note 7, at 13.
9. Charles T. Rubin, The God Meme, NEW ATLANTIS, Spring 2006, at 71, 73-74
(reviewing DANIEL C. DENNETT, BREAKING THE SPELL: RELIGION AS A NATURAL
PHENOMENON (2006)).
10. Id. at 75 (discussing Daniel Dennett's views).
11. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SHANNON, CONSPICUOUS CRITICISM: TRADITION, THE
INDIVIDUAL, AND CULTURE IN MODERN AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT 65 (rev. ed.,
Univ. of Scranton Press 2006) (1996) (describing the new individualism and John Dewey's
place in the new individualism pantheon).
12- See Wilfred McClay, Foreword to SHANNON, supra note 11, at viii.
13. John Finnis, Religion and State: Some Main Issues and Sources, 51 AM. J. JURIS.
107, 113-14 (2006).
14. See Rubin, supra note 9, at 74.
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ized by Justice Taney's conception of civilization that is driven by the
exigencies of compromise and the necessity of holding things together."
Since Justice Taney and the Supreme Court took on the slavery ques-
tion in the Dred Scott case, courts have assumed an expanded role in en-
forcing such values as peace and harmony while compelling national
unity." Judges, perhaps driven by their own conception of self-evident
truth and the superiority of their own judgment,17 have accepted society's
plea, sua sponte, to become statesmen." In this emerging world, inten-
tion (particularly good intention) can often be utilized to trump the plain
meaning of words. 9 In a broadly catalytic move, judges enter willingly
into compromises that exclude certain individuals and groups when nec-
essary to resolve impending controversies.20 This is particularly true
when disagreements threaten America's putative consensus or alterna-
tively, risk fracturing the nation. Consistent with this paradigm, religious
expression has been seen to pose just such a threat.
Why has the public square become so secular and so suspicious of reli-
gious expression? Explaining this move implicates the usual suspects.
Among the plausible explanations, two options resonate. First, that the
"secularization of public discourse necessarily results from increased plu-
ralism in American society" ;2' and second, "that it was the deliberate
product of a determined faction on the Supreme Court." 22 In reality, any
explanation that simply blames "judges leaves unanswered the question
of why they interpreted the Constitution in so secularist a manner...
[and] underestimates the extent to which the decisions of the Warren
Court reflected the common wisdom of their time. ' The explanatory
force of the common wisdom may be consistent with the costs of "mud-
15. See Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 410 (1856) (describing
the exclusion of members of the Negro race from the civilized world). Justice Taney took
the view that even free blacks could not be citizens within the meaning of the United
States Constitution. Id. at 418-19.
16. See Smith, supra note 1, at 17-18.
17. For a discussion of this possibility, see Nelson Lund & John 0. McGinnis, Law-
rence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1558-60 (2004).
18. Id.; see also THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 889 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter OXFORD
COMPANION].
19. See WILLIAM A. EDMUNDSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO RIGHTS 78 (2004) (dis-
cussing the Dred Scott decision).
20. See, e.g., Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 454-455 (Wayne, J., concurring).
21. Stoner, supra note 2, at 21.
22. Id.
23. Id. But see Harry V. Jaffa, Original Intent and the American Soul, CLAREMONT
REV. BOOKS, Winter 2005-2006, at 36, 36 ("The struggle for control of the Supreme Court
is a profound political struggle, going to the heart of the meaning of our existence as a free
people. For more than a half century, liberal judicial activism has been riding roughshod
over the Constitution bequeathed to us by the founders.").
2007]
Catholic University Law Review
dling through," which can be analogized to Larry Alexander's under-
standing of the right of freedom of expression.24 As thus understood,
secularization signifies "practices that have a rule-consequentialist struc-
ture of justification specific to particular kinds of questions and to par-
ticular cultures, eras, and technologies."" In harmony with that percep-
tion, one fruitful hypothesis suggests that the secularized public square
mirrors "the prior secularization of the university" grounded in the de-
duction that pedagogy has stripped theology from the branch of knowl-
edge and mandates that it and religion be understood as "merely an
elaboration of [subjective] belief."26 Another proposition, consistent with
the first, intimates that the public square reverberates with a pedagogy
that denies there are objective moral truths that reason can disclose with-
out appeals to faith and revelation." Although Larry Alexander argues
that attempts to distinguish between faith and reason are tenuous on an
epistemological level, 8 these two moves not only anticipate Richard
Rorty's various claims about truth'9 and progress, ° but also may have
legal consequence, that place adherents to religiously grounded views at a
disadvantage. Whatever its source, the religious-secular divide reflects a
clash of orthodoxies in which the terms of the debate may render reli-
gious conviction without the defensive cover supplied by rationality that
24. LARRY ALEXANDER, Is THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 185-93
(2005) (explaining the process of muddling through with respect to freedom of expression
concerns in a liberal society).
25. Id. at 180-81.
26. Stoner, supra note 2, at 21.
27. See Response of Hadley Arkes, Correspondence, CLAREMONT REV. BOOKS,
Winter 2005-2006, at 4, 4 (suggesting that "human beings have reasoned about these mat-
ters of moral consequence ... without appeals to faith and revelation" as a form of natural
law and perhaps natural rights). It is also possible that today "bad natural rights teachings
have all but forced out good natural rights teachings." Ralph A. Rossum, A More De-
pendable Approach, CLAREMONT REV. BOOKS, Winter 2005-2006, at 37, 37.
28. ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 152 (noting that it may be impossible to make a
convincing epistemological distinction between faith and reason).
29. For example, postmodernists contend that there is no such thing as truth "out
there." See, e.g., RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 5 (1989);
RICHARD RORTY, TRUTH AND PROGRESS: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, VOLUME 3, at 20
(1998) [hereinafter RORTY, TRUTH AND PROGRESS] (raising the postmodern pragmatist
possibility that "the difference between true beliefs considered as useful nonrepresenta-
tional mental states, and as accurate (and therefore useful) representations of reality,
seemed a difference that could make no difference to practice"). But see J.
BUDZISZEWSKI, WHAT WE CAN'T NOT KNOW 167 (2003) (noting that antifoundational-
ism may denote the contemporary manifestation of Sophism that appears to deny reality
while resisting metanarratives that attempt to make sense out of life).
30. See RORTY, TRUTH AND PROGRESS, supra note 29, at 185 (suggesting that moral
progress largely consists of sad and sentimental stories, which have as their objective, an-
swering this question: "Why should I care about a stranger, a person who is no kin to me?"
Evidently, the appropriate answer drives us toward inclusion as a value).
[Vol. 56:361
Shaming Kindergarteners
is achieved through contestation31 - if, of course, rationality and truth can
be relied on in a progressively more postmodern world.
Given the clash of orthodoxies, the disputed territory encircled by First
Amendment jurisprudence tends to discharge more heat than light.
Against this backdrop, the United States Supreme Court's 2006 decision
denying a writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, once again, proclaimed a preeminent role for courts in
public school governance and freedom of expression disputes.32 The Su-
preme Court refused to reconsider a Second Circuit opinion, Peck v.
Baldwinsville Central School District, which concluded it may be possible
for plaintiffs to prevail in a lawsuit to vindicate freedom of expression
rights of children.33 At issue was a school district's censorship of an art
poster drawn by Antonio Peck, a kindergartener.3 The poster, drawn as
part of a class assignment, contained a picture of Jesus.35 In reversing the
lower court's opinion in favor of the school district, the Second Circuit
concentrated on the plaintiff's freedom of speech claims,3 6 despite the fact
that the poster was drawn in what has been called a nonpublic forum.37
The Second Circuit suggested that Antonio Peck's right to display the
poster could withstand the school district's motion for summary judg-
ment.3 Although the court denied Antonio's establishment clause
claim,39 "[t]he Second Circuit joined the Ninth and the Eleventh Circuits
in holding that public schools may not censor a student's viewpoint on a
permissible subject matter when it is responsive to a school assignment or
31. See Stanley Hauerwas, Theology as Knowledge, FIRST THINGS, May 2006, at 23,
23.
32. See Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Peck, 126 S. Ct. 1880 (2006).
33. News Release, Liberty Counsel, U.S. Supreme Court Allows Decision to Stand
That Says Pub. Sch. May Not Censor Religious Viewpoints of Students in Class Assign-
ments (Apr. 24,2006), http:/Ic.orglibertyalert/2006laO42406b.htm.
34. Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 620-21 (2d Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 1880 (2006).
35. Id. at 621-22.
36. Id. at 625-33.
37. Id. at 626-27.
38. Id. at 624-25 (noting "that further discovery might uncover a) evidence of animus
or hostility by [Baldwinsville Central School District] toward Christianity or toward relig-
ion generally, and b) indications as to the accuracy of [the school district's] claim that An-
tonio's poster was not responsive to the assignment").
39. Id. at 620.
2007]
Catholic University Law Review
program."4 By contrast, "[t]he First and Tenth [C]ircuits hold that view-
point discrimination in the curricular context may be permissible.,
41
The question becomes: how did America reach the position where stu-
dent posters so effectively threaten societal cohesion that bureaucratic or
judicial intervention is required? The Baldwinsville case may offer an
answer. One reading of the facts of the case suggests that school officials
are committed to the opinion that society must indoctrinate children so
they are capable of autonomy.4 Apparently, instead of answering one
basic question-" [w]hat is best for man" - students must answer, and see
as important, another - "what is best for me" - as part of the liberal and
republican focus "that exalts the individual self as a bundle of desires,"
the fulfillment of which are protected rights.43 Uniform with this verdict,
public school officials as enablers of the "liberal tradition" have been
rightly concerned about the necessity to screen out nonhomogenizing
viewpoints that might upset members of the public, or otherwise call into
question the presumably desirable secular consensus on the meaning of
life, the global environment, or the cosmos.44
By contrast, for parents of deep religious devotion, liberal principles
and educational pedagogy may supply important values but not necessar-
ily sufficient conditions for a life lived in the kind of community that they
envision. In agreement with philosopher Alasdair Maclntyre's critique of
contemporary intellectual and popular culture,45 captivated by the impos-
40. News Release, Liberty Counsel, supra note 33; see also Planned Parenthood of S.
Nev., Inc. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817, 829 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (applying
viewpoint neutrality standard to a nonpublic school forum); Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d
1314, 1324 (11th Cir. 1989) (disallowing viewpoint-based discrimination in a nonpublic
forum).
41. News Release, Liberty Counsel, supra note 33; see also Fleming v. Jefferson
County Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 926-29 (10th Cir. 2002) (allowing "educators to make
viewpoint-based decisions about school-sponsored speech"); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448,
450 (1st Cir. 1993) (affirming the district court's judgment sustaining a public school com-
mittee's decision to not reappoint a biology teacher who discussed abortion from her per-
spective in class).
42. See generally Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 99-CV-1847, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13362, at *8-9 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2000), vacated, 7 F. App'x 74 (2d Cir. 2001).
43. Stephen L. Carter, Liberal Hegemony and Religious Resistance: An Essay on Le-
gal Theory, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 25, 45-46 (Michael W.
McConnell et al. eds., 2001).
44. This viewpoint may operate consistently with the conclusion that public schools
should construct children for the benefit of the state. See id. at 50.
45. Simply put by Richard John Neuhaus, Maclntyre argues "that not only intellectu-
als but our popular culture has largely abandoned an understanding of moral truth and
virtue, with the result that we are all dog-paddling in the murky sea of 'modem emotiv-
ism."' RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, CATHOLIC MATTERS: CONFUSION, CONTROVERSY,
AND THE SPLENDOR OF TRUTH 145-46 (2006).
[Vol. 56:361
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sibility of imagining civilization without "a sense of sacred," such par-
ents may see their children as something more than a random bundle of
preferences cabined solely by subjectivism.47 If society's consensus holds
that everyone should seek fulfillment in atomistic autonomy, it is possible
that all sorts of parents (religious and nonreligious) will disagree with
that consensus for all sorts of reasons. This development leads inexora-
bly to tension between a liberal state that acts as a creator of meaning,
and communities and individuals that are animated by an alternative
viewpoint. 8 Tension is not a surprising development. "No state is truly
interested in preserving independent communities of meanings. States,
historically, have been interested in preserving themselves.,
49
While it could be argued that a "liberal state should be different, be-
cause of its supposed neutrality among competing conceptions of the
good," in actuality the liberal state may be "just as insistent as any other
that everybody should believe the same basic things ... as long as they
are liberal things."50 Although pluralists contend that judicial protection
of diverse opinions can rightly be defended on a countermajoritarian ba-
sis," it is likely that countermajoritarianism remains ineffective when
courts themselves are captured and captivated by the prevailing dogma,
which requires the minority to lose even when the majority is wrong." As
an empirical matter, few, if any, adherents to non-Christian faiths have
won religious freedom cases before the Supreme Court. 3 Equally true,
"[d]issenting Christians have not fared well either, [particularly] in recent
years. ' Indeed, if courts are driven by a calculus that is premised on
their extra-constitutional role as our national conciliator, then it is ever
more likely that adjudication leads inevitably to minority acquiescence
5
when members of resisting faith communities' practices and motives are
46. See George Weigel, Foreword to JOSEPH RATZINGER & MARCELLO PERA,
WITHOUT ROOTS: THE WEST, RELATIVISM, CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM, at vii, vii (Michael F.
Moore trans., 2006) (asking the question: "[I]s it possible to imagine anything properly
called 'civilization' that lacks a sense of the sacred?").
47. See NEUHAUS, supra note 45, at 145-46.
48. Carter, supra note 43, at 31 ("If the state tries to domesticate religion, its most
powerful competitor in the creation of meaning, then religion tries simultaneously to sub-
vert the state.").
49. Id. at 34.
50. Id. (omission in original).
51. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713, 720
(1985).
52. Id. at 719.
53. Carter, supra note 43, at 35-36.
54. Id. at 36; see also Gregory C. Sisk, How Traditional and Minority Religions Fare in
the Courts: Empirical Evidence from Religious Liberty Cases, 76 U. COLO. L. REv. 1021,
1023-24 (2005) (noting that "adherents to traditionalist Christian faiths ... enter the court-
house doors at a distinct disadvantage").
55. See Ackerman, supra note 51, at 719.
2007]
Catholic University Law Review
seen as illiberal by the defenders of the secular consensus. My thesis is
that members of what might be called "minority faiths" that hold sincere
but "divisive views" are increasingly likely to be placed at risk by lan-
guage that reifies society's "progressive" interest in suppression through
conciliation. This process is likely to expand when school hierarchs
transmute judicial language and goals into operational dogma while rais-
ing the putatively omnipresent specter of division when they confront
adherents to deeply held religious faiths and diverse practices.
In Part II, I consider the Baldwinsville case as well as the split among
the United States courts of appeal. Although I provide some analysis of
the facts, the district court case, and the Second Circuit's holding, the
primary purpose of this examination is not to provide extensive legal
analysis, but to discover and set forth the terms of the debate. This inves-
tigation includes an excursion into the notion of evaluative neutrality,
metaphysics, epistemology, and the nature of liberal society. Regardless
of the actual outcome of Baldwinsville or any similar case, I conclude it is
highly doubtful that the prevailing terms of the debate can be seen to
favor religious expression that reflects deeply held, as opposed to shal-
low, beliefs.
In Part III, I build on the claims of Steven Smith, Robert Nagel, and
Larry Alexander, coupled with the observation that "[i]t is simply self-
congratulatory to suppose that the members of our own persuasion have
reached their convictions in a deeply reflective way, whereas those es-
pousing opinions we hate are superficial,, 56 in order to contest the justifi-
cation offered for shame production in public schools. I conclude that
because lower courts and public officials are constrained by Supreme
Court precedents and the common wisdom, whether they rule in favor of
or against viewpoint discrimination in a given case, the paramount objec-
tive of judges and school hierarchs is to achieve conciliation and inclu-
sion, even at the price of vilification. As such, public officials and courts,
whatever language they deploy, are merely doing politics.
II. SCHOOL CHILDREN IN THE CROSSHAIRS
A. Background
First Amendment jurisprudence concerning religion is quite cumber-
some. This arena can be usefully divided into several categories includ-
ing free exercise, establishment, and freedom of expression. When free
exercise is at issue, it is "widely accepted that religious freedom prohibits
the government from directly punishing or regulating religious beliefs.
5
1
Similarly, "speech with religious content or motivation" has received ro-
56. Id. at 739.
57. OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 18, at 843.
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bust protection under both the Free Exercise Clause and Free Speech
Clause.58 When Establishment Clause questions are raised, it seems clear
"that it is unconstitutional for public schools to seek to indoctrinate stu-
dents to religion," 9 that "[s]chool prayer and some forms of moments of
silence are not permissible," 6 and that "a state may not require the teach-
ing of creationism or a balanced curriculum., 6' Thus, the Establishment
Clause limits the messages that public schools may convey to students.
The rules that illuminate the freedom of expression rights of students,
the focus of this Article, are complicated but include a rule "that students
may not be compelled.. . to affirm beliefs they do not hold. ' 62 Any con-
versation about viewpoint discrimination, content-based regulation, and
freedom of expression, particularly religious freedom of expression in
public or nonpublic fora, is fraught with difficulties.6' This conversation is
likely to be swollen with elastic words, and crammed with postmodern
language. Those who enter this discussion without having their eyes wide
open to the countless dynamic moves and roles that courts and commen-
tators are inclined to play risk dyspepsia. "Within this contested terrain,
commentators and judges often congratulate themselves about unverifi-
able insights, including the divisiveness of religious practice, the asserted
yet unproven tolerance generated by the common public school, the
imaginary wall of separation between church and state," 6 as well as the
58. Id.
59. Id. at 283.
60. Id. (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)).
61. Id. (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97 (1968)).
62. Id. (citing W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)).
63. One difficulty is what constitutes religion. Religion may mean a number of things
including: "whatever constitutes a person's ultimate concern," "the presence of faith," or
alternatively, as "a belief in extra-temporal consequences." Eduardo Pefialver, Note, The
Concept of Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791, 794 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). Another difficulty concerns how religious liberty is to be protected. One view
suggests "the establishment clause protects religious liberty; it safeguards much the same
interests as the free exercise clause, but in a slightly different way. The free exercise clause
defines the important individual liberty of religious freedom while the establishment ad-
dresses the limits of allowable state classification affecting this liberty." Michael A.
Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Estab-
lishment Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 313 (1986) (emphasis and
footnote omitted).
64. Harry G. Hutchison, Liberal Hegemony? School Vouchers and the Future of the
Race, 68 Mo. L. REV. 559, 563 (2003). Justice O'Connor argues that the appropriate con-
stitutional focus on divisiveness should ultimately concentrate "on the character of the
government activity that might cause such divisiveness, not on the divisiveness itself."
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,689 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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purported necessity of "the public versus private dichotomy." 6  It is
probable that these insights and values are largely aspirational. The
premise is clear enough. When, and if, society reaches the proper com-
promise about intractable issues, foreseeable threats to democracy, socie-
tal cohesion, and liberalism as a governing philosophy will be muted. No
matter how many times Justice Hugo Black's understanding of neutrality
is cited,66 it is doubtful that America can provide a thoroughly neutral
evaluation about views that can be seen as dangerously inconsistent with
society's cosmopolitan goals and objectives.
On one account, "liberalism has grown ever more muscular, pressing
theories about education and the public square that few religious citizens
will ever support." 67 As thus understood, religious citizens and religious
expression pose a danger to a liberal society and liberal schools that aim
to construct people for the benefit of a state, which is committed to indi-
vidual liberation and human singularity. 68 In truth, whatever the source
of danger to America's public schools and public institutions, it is vital to
bear in mind that "[d]angers to a society may be mortal without being
immediate. One such danger is the prevailing social vision of our time-
and the dogmatism with which the ideas, assumptions, and attitudes be-
hind that vision are held." 69 It should be no surprise that judicial deci-
sion-making reflects the prevailing wisdom of our age. When courts man-
date consensus premised on assumptions consistent with liberal dogma
suggesting that they have attained their pliable convictions about the
good in deeply reflective ways (whereas those who hold opposite opin-
ions are superficial),70 it is possible that the courts themselves jeopardize
the nation that they, with the best of intentions, wish to hold together. In
harmony with Bruce Ackerman's intuition, courts defend neutrality
among competing visions of the good life,71 while failing to understand
that "[t]he liberal values of neutrality, tolerance, and rationality are
themselves non-neutral. 72 Often when the terms of the debate are cab-
65. Hutchison, supra note 64, at 563; Martha Minow, Partners, Not Rivals?: Redrawing
the Lines Between Public and Private, Non-Profit and Profit, and Secular and Religious, 80
B.U. L. REV. 1061, 1080 (2000) ("[M]any critical legal studies scholars and feminists tar-
geted the public/private divide as an illusory and mystifying element of liberal legalism.").
66. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) ("[The First] Amend-
ment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and
non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary.").
67. Carter, supra note 43, at 53.
68. Id. at 50-51.
69. THOMAS SOWELL, THE VISION OF THE ANOINTED: SELF-CONGRATULATION AS
A BASIS FOR SOCIAL POLICY 1 (1995).
70. See Ackerman, supra note 51, at 739.
71. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 139 (1980).
72. Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 131,158 (1995).
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ined by concepts such as neutrality and tolerance, the debate becomes
unintelligible.
Nonetheless, the failure to recognize any "values at all is to deny a dif-
ference between ourselves and other particles that tumble in space.""
Equally possible, "[f]aw is the principal [vehicle] through which" well-
socialized Americans can assert their values.74 A yearning for concilia-
tion as a desirable value can assume many forms as law, or as simple legal
argumentation that lubricates the predisposition to exclude certain view-
points from the realm of "reasonableness., 75  Whatever shape it takes,
court-mandated and supervised conciliation as a goal functions reliably
with Justice Black's assertion that public schools should be seen as in-
struments of tranquility wherein "[u]ncontrolled and uncontrollable lib-
erty is an enemy to domestic peace., 76 Although conciliation as a justify-
ing rationale may or may not operate consistently with Justice Black's
disavowal of the majority's reasoning77 in Tinker v. Des Moines Independ-
ent Community School District, Justice Black contends that "the Court
arrogates to itself, rather than to the State's elected officials charged with
running the schools, the decision as to which school disciplinary regula-
tions [governing freedom of expression] are 'reasonable.' '78 In any case,
American courts and school hierarchs have been drawn repeatedly to the
imprimatur of "no endorsement," conciliation, inclusion, and tolerance
ever since Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's remarkable concurrence in
Lynch v. Donnelly.79 This imprimatur for all its imprecision can be ap-
plied usefully to exclude certain viewpoints from the public square.
The case law confirms that "state-operated schools may not be enclaves
of totalitarianism" and "students may not be regarded as closed-circuit
recipients of only that which the State chooses to communicate."' Su-
preme Court precedents state that permitting school property to be used
73. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 5 (1975).
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 524 (1969) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
77. See id. at 516-17.
78. Id. at 517.
79. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (con-
centrating on whether the government's purpose can be seen as endorsing religion, and
finding that a city display that included a creche, among other symbols, was not intended
to convey any message of endorsement of Christianity or disapproval of non-Christian
religions). Instead of promoting religion, the city of Pawtucket aimed to celebrate the
public holiday through traditional symbols. See id. As thus understood, government can
neither endorse nor disapprove of religion because "[e]ndorsement sends a message to
nonadherents [to a particular religion] that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community," whereas "[d]isapproval sends the opposite message" and excludes
adherents from full political community. Id. at 688.
80. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511.
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for the presentation of all views on a particular issue except those from a
81religious standpoint constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination.
These sentiments suggest careful adjudicators ought to avoid entrenching
"'undue concentration of power.' ' 82 Coherent with that understanding,
"[c]hurches, synagogues, and other religious organizations were (and to a
great extent still are) the leading institutions for the formation and dis-
semination of values and opinions." 3  A rich diversity of viewpoints
would be undermined if formation and dissemination of ideas were sub-
jected to centralized political and educational control. 8, To be sure, the
Supreme Court observes a distinction between speech discrimination
because of its subject matter (content) and discrimination because of the
speaker's specific motivating ideology or opinion (viewpoint).8 Al-
though such distinctions are unlikely to be helpful in every case, discrimi-
nation tends to be permissible in the former but not the latter. Indeed,
ideologically driven efforts to suppress a particular point of view are pre-
sumptively unconstitutional in many contexts. 86 Though viewpoint dis-
crimination is properly understood as "an egregious form of content dis-
crimination, '" 7 even this claim is not beyond dispute by Justices who fear
the State's failure to discriminate against religion constitutes an imper-
missible "endorsement" of religion and hence violates the Establishment
Clause. 8' Nevertheless, Supreme Court adjudication, while protecting the
personal expression of students, does not necessarily protect all student
speech within a curricular context.89
81. Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393-94
(1993); see also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102 (2001) (finding
that the exclusion of an admittedly religious club from meeting after hours at a public
school constitutes viewpoint discrimination violative of the club's free speech rights, and
further ruling that permitting the club to meet does not violate the Establishment Clause).
82. Michael W. McConnell, Governments, Families, and Power: A Defense of Educa-
tional Choice, 31 CONN. L. REv. 847, 848 (1999) (citation omitted); see also Marci A. Ham-
ilton, Power, The Establishment Clause, and Vouchers, 31 CONN. L. REV. 807, 811-12
(1999) (arguing that the fundamental purpose of the Establishment Clause is to prevent
undue concentration of power).
83. McConnell, supra note 82, at 848.
84. Id. On one account, "[a]uthority here is to be controlled by public opinion, not
public opinion by authority." W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641
(1943).
85. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-07 (disallowing discrimination on the basis
of viewpoint, but apparently allowing reasonable restrictions with respect to subject matter
or content); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-30 (1995).
86. See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834-35 (disallowing viewpoint discrimination in
a public university funding controversy).
87. Id at 829.
88. See, e.g., id. at 863-64 (Souter, J., dissenting).
89. OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 18, at 283 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)).
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On one account, before considering the legitimacy of judicial pro-
nouncements that support or undermine student expression in public
settings, it is important to ask whether judicial intervention rests on some
form of liberalism (pure or impure).90 In reality, when intervention rests
on either form of liberalism, the courts' legitimacy cannot rest simply on
empirical claims or on some sort of epistemological divide "between what
we can claim justifiably to know secularly ... and what we can claim justi-
fiably to know religiously" because "[n]o such epistemological divide
exists."9' Contemporary liberal propositions are neither empirical nor
nonneutral but metaphysical and normative? Although Larry Alexan-
der provides additional reasons for plausible suspicion concerning liberal
propositions, consider the following Supreme Court rules.
Supreme Court precedent notes "that school officials [have] compre-
hensive authority to set rules in the schools." 93 Students and teachers do
not, however, "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate."94 Nevertheless, the right of freedom
of expression enjoyed by students in public schools must be "applied in
light of the special characteristics of the school environment. '" 95 This
statement forecasts that schools have both the power and the right to say
what student expression is allowable. The Court, in Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier, states, "'[t]he determination of what manner of
speech in the classroom or in [a] school assembly is inappropriate prop-
erly rests with the school board,' rather than with the federal courts.
''
9
Adjudication shows that "[t]he extent of one's freedom to speak on gov-
ernment property is largely dependent on the nature of the forum in
which the speech is delivered." 97 Within a limited public forum, restric-
tions on speech based on subject matter are permissible only if "the dis-
tinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the fo-
rum and are viewpoint neutral." 98 Regulation on speech in a limited pub-
lic forum must not be "an effort to suppress expression merely because
public officials oppose the speaker's view. ' 99
90. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 152-54 (defining pure and impure
liberalism).
91. Id. at 155.
92. Id. at 155-56.
93. OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 18, at 1023 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
94. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
95. Id.
96. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988) (first alteration in
original) (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)).
97. Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 99-CV-1847, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13362, at *15 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 15,2000), vacated, 7 F. App'x 74 (2d Cir. 2001).
98. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).
99. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,46 (1983).
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Applying these rules, the Baldwinsville federal district court found that
the school district created a nonpublic forum.'0° Within a nonpublic fo-
rum, the question is "whether the student speech in issue is 'tolerated' or
'promoted' expression."'0'1 Operationally, educators have "substantially
greater control over promoted expression than over tolerated expres-
sion." 02 Thus, if Antonio's poster fell within the parameters of promoted
expression, this might allow the district court to focus on "whether the




The plaintiff sought an injunction, declaratory judgment, and damages
for the conduct of Susan Weichert, a kindergarten teacher working for
the Baldwinsville Central School District.'0 The first poster submitted
"bore a depiction of Jesus praying, two children on a rock accompanied
by the word 'Savior'.. . . It bore the handwritten words, 'The only way to
save our world. ' ''"ce The teacher rejected the first poster submitted by the
plaintiff, a six-year-old kindergarten student enrolled at Catherine McNa-
mara Elementary School.'O The "plaintiff prepared a second poster
which depicted children picking up trash and placing it in a trash can in
front of a church, adults placing items in a recycling bin, the earth and
clouds, and a kneeling figure with a beard and wearing a robe."' 7 The
schoolteacher, with Principal Robert Creme's concurrence, "folded the
[second] poster so that the kneeling figure could not be seen."'" The
plaintiff claimed that this conduct subjected him to "'ridicule,"' to "'belit-
tling of his religious belief,"' and to "'embarrassment in front of his
classmates. '""' 9 Plaintiff also asserted "that he 'desires from time to time
to engage in First Amendment protected activity by incorporating reli-
gious themes within his schoolwork as appropriate.'''..°
The plaintiff brought four separate causes of action against the school
district: (A) the "defendants impermissibly restricted his exercise of his
100. Baldwinsville, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13362, at *18.
101. Id.
102. Id. at *19.
103. Id. at *21.
104. Id. at *1-2.
105. Id. at *3.
106. Id. at *2. The plaintiff was asked to prepare a poster that would "enhance the
student's understanding of his environment." Id. The posters were to be displayed on
June 4, 1999, and the assignment required the children to use pictures or words "depicting
ways to save our environment." Id.
107. Id. at *3.
108. Id. at *34.




First Amendment right to freedom of speech"; (B) the "defendants
impermissibly denied him equal protection of the law by treating him
differently from other similarly situated individuals on the basis of [his]
religious viewpoint, expression, and the content of his speech"; (C) the
"defendants impermissibly deprived him of his First Amendment right to
the free exercise of religion"; and finally, (D) the "defendants violated
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment."' 1. The plaintiff then
sought a number of remedies, including an injunction and a declaration
holding defendant's policy unconstitutional.11 2 The claims referenced in
(C) and (D) were not discussed substantially by the federal district court,
and only the freedom of speech claim was eventually reinstated by the
Second Circuit."3 I focus primarily on the claim that the defendants
impermissibly restricted the plaintiff's exercise of his First Amendment
right to freedom of speech.
Conceding the obvious, Susan Weichert stated that kindergarten stu-
dents are "extremely impressionable. 11 4 She also claimed that students
cannot be depended on to ascertain what a teacher endorses.' That
claim cuts both ways-particularly in a case where the plaintiff's work is
excluded while other students' work is included. As more fully devel-
oped below, Ms. Weichert relied heavily on the Supreme Court's "no
endorsement" rationale to assert that the plaintiff's poster must be ex-
cluded."' Further, Ms. Weichert asserted that "the left side of the poster
was ... unresponsive to the [teaching] assignment," requiring that she
"conceal the kneeling figure depicted therein not to 'censor' religious
expression but to display only so much of the poster as appeared to be
responsive to the assignment given. 1. 7
C. Analysis
This claim bears analysis. If the defendants' claim that they were not
engaged in religious censorship can be taken seriously, the defendants
were simply implementing a form of so-called Track Two regulation of
expression. That is, the defendants were enforcing a rule "that inciden-
111. Id. at *4-5.
112. Id. at *6.
113. See id. at *24-30; see also Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 620,
625 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1880 (2006).
114. Baldwinsville, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13362, at *7.
115. Id.
116. See id. at *8.
117. Id. at *7-8.
118. See ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at xi-xii (explaining that Track Two laws and
regulations are rules "that have 'message effects' but that are not enacted [or enforced]
because of their message effects"). Alexander concludes that the scope of freedom of
expression, if it exists at all, is confined to laws passed with the purpose of affecting mes-
sages. Id. at xi.
2007]
Catholic University Law Review
tally affect[s] what gets said, by whom, to whom, and with what effect."" 9
Many commentators exclude from freedom of expression claims all laws
that have incidental "message effects."'20 By contrast, Track One laws
and regulations are largely cabined by purpose to affect the message.
More specifically, Larry Alexander contends that the core right of
"[f]reedom of expression is implicated whenever an activity is suppressed
or penalized for the purpose of preventing a message from being re-
ceived."' 2
Deciding whether the poster was excised because of how its religious
viewpoint might be received, or because it failed to respond adequately to
an assignment raises complex questions. Answers may be found in the
school teacher's affidavit, which stated that religious content could not be
educationally responsive to her assignment.'3 This form of purportedly
content-based regulation 24 seems to require a form of balancing that ap-
pears difficult, if not impossible, to square with a coherent examination of
freedom of expression claims. If balancing is put forward as the correct
solution, problems arise since "[t]he entire corpus juris, from the general
common law of contracts, property, and torts to the most particular tax
regulations, affects what gets said, by whom, to whom, and to what ef-
fect."'25 If balancing is required, balancing is unlikely to be possible with-
out reference to the truthfulness, correctness, or value of what is being
said.2 6 Finally, "we must assign a value to the audience's loss of informa-
tion due to incidental restrictions on speech.' ' 127 For a number of reasons,
it appears doubtful that Ms. Weichert's reasoning is either persuasive or
workable. One is left with the impression that Antonio's message was
119. Id. at xi.
120. See, e.g., id.
121. See generally id. at 55-81. On one account, the taxonomy of Track One analysis
apparently considers whether to allow government regulation of speech because it is harm-
ful. Thus, "[wihen receipt of a message is itself directly harmful, and government wishes to
regulate the message for that reason, its regulations are either always or never violative of
the right of freedom of expression," at least on a tentative basis. Id. at 80. As understood,
it would be impossible for government "to carve out an intermediate position" because
that would require that the government "weigh the value of the messages expressed
against the disvalue of the harms they cause." Id. Further, "message evaluation by the
government seems deeply inconsistent with any conception of freedom of expression." Id.
122. Id. at 9.
123. See Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 99-CV-1847, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13362, at *7-8 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 15,2000), vacated, 7 F. App'x 74 (2d Cir. 2001).
124. Keep in mind that on one account, if content regulation becomes sufficiently egre-
gious, it operates as a form of viewpoint discrimination. See Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995).
125. ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 21 (emphasis added).
126. See id. at 20-21.
127. Id. at 20.
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suppressed because of its content or viewpoint. Apparently, the school
district did not wish his message to be received.
Susan Weichert also provided another rationale for her censorship.
She stated, "if displayed, [the poster] would have tended to create a false
impression of the District's educational practices and curriculum by im-
plying that the District taught that religion or God would save the envi-
ronment."'"8 If her claim is true, it verifies that certain kinds of speech
cannot be allowed, not only because of their content, but because certain
viewpoints cannot be expressed in certain settings within a liberal society.
Directly implicating the Supreme Court's "no endorsement" refrain, the
teacher further stated: "[The] false impression would have led the public
to believe that the District promotes one particular religion over another
... [leading] impressionable students and perhaps even their parents [to]
have understood the implied message of said poster to carry my approval
and endorsement."1 29 If the latter claim is true, she excised the poster
because of its religious content and because of its religious viewpoint,
implicating message effects, and not simply because of pedagogical rea-
sons. Emphasizing that she "was in the best position to" judge the plain-
tiff's poster, she found that it failed to comply with "accepted pedagogical
goals and concerns., 130 One interpretation of her claim is that suppres-
sion is necessary because private religious speech has nothing serious to
offer in an academic/educational setting.3
Another interpretation of Ms. Weichert's statement is that Antonio's
poster could not be pedagogically responsive so long as reasonable ob-
servers could view his drawing as confirming the school's ostensible con-
centration on teaching and endorsing religious messages despite the secu-
lar messages attached to nearly eighty other posters. As applied, the "no
endorsement" rule must mean that allowing any religious expression con-
stitutes endorsement, and yet, the other side of the "no endorsement"
rule as intuited by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor prohibits the govern-
ment from disapproving of religion.'32 To be sure, "[i]t is commonplace
[to assert] that no educational program can be neutral among groups."'33
Coherent with that perspective, rejection of Antonio's poster constitutes
something less than evaluative neutrality. Rejection is, after all, rejec-
tion. It is doubtlessly true that "[a]ny philosophical account of political
morality" or virtually anything else including the environment must "take
128. Baldwinsville, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13362, at *8.
129. Id. at *8-9.
130. Id. at *9.
131. I am indebted to Professor Gregory Wallace for bringing this insight to my atten-
tion.
132. Smith, supra note 1, at 17.
133. ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 168.
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a stand on what is true, right, and valuable and what is not."'' Environ-
mentalism or "concern for the environment" "must be 'partisan' in favor
of its own conclusions [and] ... regard as error and possibly malign those
ideas that it rejects."'35 If Ms. Weichert can be properly seen as a de-
fender of liberalism in any of its various renditions-including its "no
endorsement" attire-she must reject all positions that are inconsistent
with her understanding of liberalism and the environment because
"[t]here is no neutral ground in [such] matters."' Neither Antonio's
claims nor any other claim excepting the truth of liberalism and its prog-
eny-the "proper approach to the environment" -can be accepted as
neutrality. 137 Still, properly understood, "messages of endorsement or
disapproval of religion are [constitutionally] impermissible because they
cause some people to feel like outsiders or 'lesser members of the politi-
cai community.", 138 Evidently, the school district's understanding of the
"no endorsement" thesis requires that Antonio Peck and his religious
expression be removed from full communion with the Baldwinsville edu-
cational community. On the school district's account, his views, for the
best of "generally acceptable pedagogical goals and concerns," brand him
an outsider. 139 The Baldwinsville school district approach is unexcep-
tional and unpersuasive.
If the "no endorsement" rationale is unhelpful, one way out of this
quagmire is to accept Thomas Nagel's reasonably rejectable thesis as a
legitimizing criteria.' 4° It might then be argued that Antonio's poster
might be reasonably rejectable in the same sense that Nagel "argues that
coercive imposition of norms is unfair (in a morally overriding sense) if
such norms are reasonably rejectable," because "[n]orms are reasonably
rejectable in [a] disqualifying sense if they rest on grounds that are not
publicly accessible.''4 Since it can be argued that "[r]eligious grounds
are not publicly accessible to those outside the religion,"1 42 Antonio has
engaged in a moral wrong by seeking to impose coercively his views
about the environment on his classmates. For a number of reasons,
Alexander shows that the reasonably rejectable framework is irretrieva-
bly unworkable.'43
134. Id. at 148-49.
135. Id. at 149.
136. Id. My debt to Alexander should be obvious.
137. See id. at 168.
138. Smith, supra note 1, at 17.
139. Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 99-CV-1847, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13362, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2000), vacated, 7 F. App'x 74 (2d Cir. 2001).
140. See THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY 161-64 (1991).
141. ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 156.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 156-60 (showing, among other things, that from the perspective of the be-
liever whose norms are at risk, none of her norms can be reasonably rejected; or altema-
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Still, there is at least one more sense in which we might invoke the rea-
sonable rejectability thesis to justify the exclusion of certain kinds of reli-
gious expression. Although there is more to be said later on the subject
of epistemology, consider the possibility "that the 'truth' of religious
propositions rests on an epistemology that is different in kind from the
epistemology underlying claims of truth for ordinary factual and moral
propositions." ' 4 If one accepts that religious expression amounts to a
statement of belief that has been stripped from its place as a branch of
knowledge, then appropriately applied pedagogy deprives religious ex-
pression of a place in a nonpublic forum. 145 Either approach leaves the
government, in Professor Chemerinsky's view, desirably and "completely
secular."'" That being said:
[F]or the typical religious adherent, her religious beliefs are con-
tinuous with her beliefs about other matters, and all her beliefs
are mutually reinforcing to the extent they cohere. There is no
separate sphere of religious beliefs that is hermetically sealed off
from nonreligious beliefs and that rests on a distinctively religious
epistemology.
While it is clear that some observers repudiate epistemology and simply
"'wish to change the subject"' altogether,'" shame production in public
schools may simply represent the impossibility of making "an epistemo-
logical distinction between faith and reason."' 49 As such, the exclusion of
religious perspectives "from the realm of coercive public policy-for the
tively, if one argues that the believers norms are only accessible to her and inaccessible to
others because she alone has had a unique experience or life, then this focus rules out the
imposition of any norms whose rejection is understandable in this way).
144. Id. at 150.
145. Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Remarks at Campbell University Law School, The Fed-
eralist Society's Student Division Panel: God and Government 3 (Fall 2005).
146. Id.
147. ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 150 (emphasis added); see also NANCY R.
PEARCEY, TOTAL TRUTH: LIBERATING CHRISTIANITY FROM ITS CULTURAL CAPTIVITY
20-22 (2004) (discussing attempts to exclude religious viewpoints through so-called
fact/value distinctions).
148. See, e.g., J. JUDD OWEN, RELIGION AND THE DEMISE OF LIBERAL
RATIONALISM: THE FOUNDATIONAL CRISIS OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE 48-51 (2001) (discussing Richard Rorty's repudiation of epistemology); see also
Paul J. Griffiths, Offer Declined, FIRST THINGS, June-July 2005, at 38, 40 (reviewing
RiCHARD RORTY & GIANNI VATriMO, THE FUTURE OF RELIGION (2005)) (noting that
in no sense should Rorty be understood to make philosophical claims as traditionally un-
derstood). Instead, Griffiths finds that Rorty can best be understood as one who identifies
a "whole vocabulary-that of truth, reality, objectivity, universality"-which is simply
refused. Id. Griffiths further contends: "Refusal is not denial. It is, instead, the abandon-
ment of one lexicon and the deployment of another.... To refute or rebut would still be to
practice philosophy, and this Rorty.. . do[es] not wish to do." Id.
149. ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 152.
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liberal or anyone else-is because those views are wrong."'5 ° This creates
a problem because contemporary liberals believe it is "wrong to extirpate
erroneous views coercively.''.
Yet this argument should not be controversial because "[i]f liberalism
or the set of propositions to which it can be reduced is true, then religious
tenets that conflict with the propositions of liberalism are false.' 52 "Lib-
eralism is in this respect just one more sectarian position, and those who
decry the 'religion' of secularism that they find characteristic of modern
liberal societies have surely affixed the correct label to their concern.'
53
Consistent with that intuition, liberalism in all of its permutation arose as
an outgrowth of "[t]he Enlightenment, which began in the seventeenth
century and flourished in the eighteenth [as] one of the great spiritual
movements of modern Europe.', 5 4 Against this backdrop, Antonio's
poster indicates that his spiritual understanding is other-regarding in na-
ture. His perception of the environment was largely nonindividualistic
wherein he suggested that salvation for all in the first poster and salvation
for the environment in the second comes from a source that is not solely
dependent on individual human behavior. Plausibly following Kant's
understanding,'-5 or alternatively, following John Finnis' explication of
philosophy that bids us to cast about for historical evidence of transcen-• - 156
dent revelation, Antonio Peck and his family hew to a faith that is a
product of reason just as surely as opposing viewpoints are derived from
reason. Yet, the language of "'reasonably related to legitimate pedagogi-
cal concerns" 57 must not only place his views and the reasons behind
them at risk, such language must declare his views as impermissibly false,
however reasonable they may be. If Antonio's views are impermissibly
false, a society must be prepared to incapacitate his efforts to express
such views within the political and educational community.
150. Id. at 164.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 150.
153. Id. In Alexander's view, those who object to the religion of secularism should
welcome this identification instead of being disturbed by this development. Id.
154. Theodore M. Greene, Introduction to IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WITHIN THE
LIMITS OF REASON ALONE, at ix (Theodore M. Greene & Hoyt H. Hudson trans., Harper
& Row 1960) (1934).
155. On this possibility, see KANT, supra note 154, at 151 ("Every one can convince
himself, through his own reason, of the evil which lies in human hearts and from which no
one is free; of the impossibility of ever holding himself to be justified before God through
his own life-conduct, and, at the same time, of the necessity for such a justification valid in
His eyes .... ").
156. Finnis, supra note 13, at 107-10.
157. Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 99-CV-1847, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13362, at *20 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2000) (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260, 273 (1988)), vacated, 7 F. App'x 74 (2d Cir. 2001).
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In the absence of an impartial examination of all of the posters, the
teacher's thesis that pedagogy mandates the exclusion of a portion of
Antonio's poster may or may not be falsifiable. What is clear is that
Susan Weichert and similarly situated teachers and the school districts
must inevitably take sides in order to ensure that the public school re-
mains secular. In fact, her affidavit, coupled with the affidavit of the
plaintiff's mother, may supply evidence that the teacher, principal, and
school district engaged in viewpoint discrimination aimed at suppressing
expression merely because public school officials opposed Antonio's
point of view.58 Indeed, the plaintiff's affidavit, if true, vitiates most, if
not all, of the teacher's justifications. For example, "[t]he poster was a
small poster."'5 9 It "was not displayed only with Antonio's kindergarten,
but with several other kindergarten classes."''6 Students would therefore
view roughly eighty posters on the cafeteria wall at once. 6' The poster
was to be displayed temporarily-only for a part of one day. 62 Antonio's
poster also contained his signature, written in crayon.163 This refutes the
possibility that reasonable observers could conclude the school endorsed
the poster or that the kindergarten class actually taught religion,164 unless
such observers reasonably believe teachers routinely identify school pol-
icy or pedagogy in crayon. In reality, the teacher's conduct indicates that
something more than pedagogy is at work. Her conduct reifies the belief
that the government violates the Establishment Clause when, in a public
school setting, it merely permits students to be exposed to private rei-
gious speech of fellow students, which hints at a different meaning of life
and hence, translates into a different way of living. 65 Conversely, if the
Establishment Clause is understood as preventing the government from
speaking about God in a way that does not pressure people to change
their religious beliefs or actions,' 66 then it is far from obvious that Anto-
nio's drawing implicates the Establishment Clause at all. Certainly, there
is scant evidence that he made any effort to impose his views on either
the school or the school district in ways that suggest the government is
imposing or favoring any one particular religion over another.' 67
That being said, it is of course true that
158. See id. at *7-11.






165. See Carter, supra note 43, at 36.
166. Gregory Wallace, Remarks at Campbell University Law School, The Federalist
Society's Student Division Panel: God and Government 17-18 (Fall 2005).
167. See id.
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as individuals, we cannot be neutral about what is good and what
is true. To live is to make choices -to pick A over B because we
prefer A, or value A, or believe A to be right. We practice a par-
ticular religion and not others. We choose to read some things
and not others .... 168
We draw certain posters and not others. Neutrality may simply be a
hopelessly null set. While John Finnis shows that "[a]ny discussion of
religion and state derails from the outset if it presumes that... 'religion is
contrasted with reason' .... [or] that no religion's claims about God and
man, world and society are reasonable," or if we accept some philosophi-
cally neutral baseline, 69 it appears that the Catherine McNamara Ele-
mentary School's "liberalism" requires it to choose between two interpre-
tations of the good. It could choose "neutrality" about what Antonio is
entitled to believe and express, or it could choose cosmopolitanism as its
conception of the good. Hence, liberalism is understood in this way as
providing Antonio with the tools to choose a life of singularity and libera-
tion that is independent of the baggage provided by religious conviction.
Bruce Ackerman shows the way. He contends:
We have no right to look upon future citizens as if we were mas-
ter gardeners who can tell the difference between a pernicious
weed and a beautiful flower. A system of liberal education pro-
vides children with a sense of the very different lives that could
be theirs-so that, as they approach maturity, they have the cul-
tural materials available to build lives equal to their evolving con-
ceptions of the good.
1 70
Ackerman implies a normative claim that appears coherent with the cos-
mopolitan idea: the State must supply Antonio with the tools that allow
him to give himself to his "own" autonomously constructed conception of
the good that is assembled independently of the community and tradi-
tions that have nourished him. Although the notion of giving oneself to
one's "own idea is not to give yourself at all,"' 17. it is likely that
"[1]iberalism can be neutral only toward those religions and religious
views that are compatible with the tenets of liberalism. 172 Antonio's
poster may be wrong from some putatively neutral pedagogical perspec-
tive, but what makes it wrong from his teacher's and school district's per-
spective is that the poster conveys the wrong message.
168. ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 165.
169. Finnis, supra note 13, at 111-12 (citation omitted).
170. ACKERMAN, supra note 71, at 139.
171. NEUHAUS, supra note 45, at 66.
172. ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 164.
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D. The District Court's and the Second Circuit's Decisions
Understanding adjudication in this case requires an additional excur-
sion into epistemology, metaphysics, and the distinctions we make be-
tween content discrimination and viewpoint discrimination. Understand-
ing these disparate, yet related, issues not only provides illumination of
the moves that the federal district court and the Second Circuit have
taken, but also provides a preview of how religious expression is likely to
be dealt with in the future.
The Baldwinsville district court converted a motion for dismissal filed
by the school district pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
12(b)(6) into a motion for summary judgment to be disposed of as pro-
vided in Rule 56.17' The district court accepted the school district's claim
that the restrictions on exhibiting Antonio Peck's poster simply repre-
sented "'editorial control over the style and content of student speech in
school-sponsored expressive activit[y]"' reasonably related to the particu-
lar assignment given.174 The court found "that the principal or primary
effect of the school's conduct neither advance[d] nor inhibit[ed] religion,"
and hence, denied Antonio's Establishment Clause claim.75 The court
also denied Antonio's Free Exercise Clause claim because the plaintiff
failed to develop a "particularization of a central religious belief or prac-
tice" that was allegedly burdened by the school district.176 Finally, the
court concluded that the "plaintiff was not denied his First Amendment
rights under the Establishment Clause, the Free Speech Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause," and therefore, no fundamental right was impli-
cated.' 77 In sum, the court concluded "as a matter of law that the com-
plaint, attachments and affidavits present[ed] no issues of material fact
and that the facts, viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, [did] not
state a meritorious claim"; therefore, the defendant school district was
"entitled to judgment as a matter of law."'' 78
This judgment bears analysis. Based on its inspection of the record, the
district court concluded that "[t]he purpose of the poster display was to
enhance the children's learning experience and to present the students'
schoolwork to their parents to show them what they had learned in the
study of the environment."' 79 At issue was individuated expression about
what was learned, which "occurred in connection with traditional educa-
173. Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 99-CV-1847, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13362, at *13 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 15,2000), vacated, 7 F. App'x 74 (2d Cir. 2001).
174. Id. at *22-24 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272
(1988)).
175. Id. at *26-28.
176. Id. at *28-29.
177. Id. at *29.
178. Id. at *30.
179. Id. at *18.
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tional activity supervised by faculty members and designed to impart par-
ticular knowledge or skills to students"; thus, the school facilities at issue
fall within the parameters of a "non-public forum as a matter of law."1'8
On the other hand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit provided an alternative understanding of the evidence. First, the
district court's judgment was overturned on the plaintiffs' first appeal
because the plaintiffs were effectively surprised by the district court's
decision to convert the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim into one of summary judgment."' Therefore, the plaintiffs were
unable to take discovery, which might have shown that the defendants
were motivated by "hostility toward Christianity or toward religion gen-
erally" when they censored Antonio's poster.
182
Responding to the plaintiffs' second appeal, the Second Circuit found:
[T]he district court overlooked evidence that, if construed in the
light most favorable to [the] Pecks, suggested that Antonio's
poster was censored not because it was unresponsive to the as-
signment, and not because Weichert and Creme believed that
[the student's mother] JoAnne Peck rather than Antonio was re-
sponsible for the poster's content, but because it offered a reli-
gious perspective on the topic of how to save the environment.
183
Before considering the question of whether the poster was responsive, or
alternatively, provided an impermissible religious perspective, consider
the claim that Antonio's mother bore some responsibility for the poster.
Rejecting the poster because its content or viewpoint could be imputed to
Antonio's mother appears to be consistent with the implication that par-
ents have no role in the education of their children. Parents, as thus de-
scribed, can be seen as part of a prephilosophic tabula rasa that has yet to
form sufficient moral and intellectual expertise. Consistent with liberal
theory, school hierarchs, by contrast, as members of the philosophic van-
guard, act as forerunners of a desirable future destination for children
and the nation. In order to reach this destination, teachers compete "ac-
tively with families for the privilege of creating meaning in the lives of
children."1 4 This move requires the subordination of the parents' role in
the upbringing of their children to the power of the State. This maneuver
disfavors parents who are animated by the analogical imagination that
looks for "resemblances, similarities, correspondences, and overlapping
truths between apparently disparate realties" -between parenting and
faith, between parenting and education, between the environment and
180. Id.
181. Peck v. Baldwinsville Sch. Bd. of Educ., 7 F. App'x 74, 75 (2d Cir. 2001).
182. Id. at 75-76.
183. Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 630 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. de-
nied, 126 S. Ct. 1880 (2006).
184. Carter, supra note 43, at 50.
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everything else-as opposed to parents who are animated by the dialecti-
cal sensibility wherein there is an emphasis on "either/or," such as either
the environment or faith, either schooling or parenting, either faith or
reason. Antonio's parents appear to fall into the category characterized
by the analogical imagination.
Overlooking the distinction between the analogical imagination and
the dialectical sensibility, the district court determined that "[t]he pur-
pose of the poster display was to enhance the children's learning experi-
ence and to present the students' schoolwork to their parents to show
them what they had learned in the study of the environment., 186 The
Second Circuit agreed with the lower court's determination that the indi-
viduated expression about what was learned "occurred in connection
with [a] traditional educational activity supervised by faculty members
and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to students.
' 87
Thus, the school facilities fall within the parameters of "a non-public fo-
rum as a matter of law." ' The court of appeals also agreed that a school
district focused on content must "regulate the content of Antonio's
poster in a reasonable manner."' 89 Citing Hazelwood with approval, the
Second Circuit maintained that the legal standard in a content discrimina-
tion case, must be sufficiently
deferential to the prerogative of educators to "assure that par-
ticipants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach,
that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may be
inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the views of the
individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the
school."'9
Evidently, educators are given wide scope to exercise "'editorial control
over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expres-
sive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns." 91  Content regulation remains permissible. As
more fully developed below, viewpoint discrimination remains suspect.
Although the Second Circuit ultimately reinstated Antonio Peck's
freedom of speech claim, the court still granted substantial and largely
unsupervised discretion to public school officials, which may place adher-
185. NEUHAUS, supra note 45, at 153. My debt to Richard John Neuhaus should be
obvious.
186. Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 99-CV-1847, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13362, at *18 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 15,2000), vacated, 7 F. App'x 74 (2d Cir. 2001).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 627 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. de-
nied, 126 S. Ct. 1880 (2006).
190. Id. at 628 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988)).
191. Id. (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273).
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ents to disfavored beliefs at risk. Evidently, it is not in the nature of lib-
eralism and its progeny, the public school system,"' to provide neutral
evaluations about things with which they disagree. Uniform with that
claim, the Second Circuit appears to accept school and teacher as the
ultimate arbiters of what gets taught about the environment.9 3 Students
must learn to "save" the environment as opposed to learning whether
there are disparate views on the environment.94 Apparently, the court of
appeals would allow indoctrination about "saving" the environment
when, as Larry Alexander shows, such issues (all issues) are matters of
partisan concern that are nonneutral and are therefore decided on a
normative and metaphysical level.' 95
Whatever the Second Circuit believes about metaphysics, it agrees that
there is a factual question concerning whether suspect viewpoint dis-
crimination is in play. The court's examination of the record sustains the
plaintiff's claim that it cannot be said as a matter of law that the school
district's enforcement of its pedagogical interests was carried out in a
non-viewpoint-neutral manner.196 Further, the court states, "drawing a
precise line of demarcation between content discrimination, which is
permissible in a non-public forum, and viewpoint discrimination, which
traditionally has been prohibited even in non-public fora, is, to say the
least, a problematic endeavor. ' '
Opposing the plaintiff's appeal, the Baldwinsville school district argued
first that its censorship of Antonio was content-related (related to appro-
priate ways of saving the environment) and therefore permissible. 98 Fur-
ther, the school district argued that even if "its decision was based on the
viewpoint rather than the content," the dismissal of Antonio's suit
"would still have been proper because Hazelwood permits schools to
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint-so long as such discrimination is,
itself, reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical interest." 199 There is
some authority for this proposition. Both "[t]he First and Tenth Circuits
have expressly held that educators may make viewpoint-based decisions
about school-sponsored speech."2' The Second Circuit, however, saw
this contention as a bridge too far. Instead, the court quoted: "'Without
192. For one view of public schools as a form of liberal hegemony, see Hutchison,
supra note 64, at 577-90.
193. See Baldwinsville, 426 F.3d at 630.
194. Cf. id.
195. See ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 155-56.
196. Baldwinsville, 426 F.3d at 630.
197. Id. (emphasis omitted).
198. See id. at 631; Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 99-CV-1847, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 13362, at *20-24 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2000), vacated, 7 F. App'x 74 (2d Cir.
2001).
199. Baldwinsville, 426 F.3d at 631 (emphasis omitted).
200. Id. at 632 n.9.
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more explicit direction [from the Supreme Court], we will continue to
require school officials to make decisions relating to speech which are
viewpoint neutral. '' 20 ' Further, the court determined "on the facts and
the legal arguments as they are currently developed ...a manifestly
viewpoint discriminatory restriction on school-sponsored speech is, prima
facie, unconstitutional, even if reasonably related to legitimate pedagogi-
cal interests.,
202
This victory may be short-lived because the court did "not foreclose the
possibility that certain aspects of the record might be developed in such a
manner as to disclose a state interest so overriding as to justify, under the
First Amendment, [the Baldwinsville Central School District's] poten-
tially viewpoint discriminatory censorship., 203 It is not difficult to find an
interest that might trump Antonio's viewpoint discrimination claim: the
state's interest in avoiding the perception of religious endorsement.
3 4
Still, on the record before it, the Second Circuit could, without diffi-
culty, understand that Susan Weichert purposed to affect the message of
the poster and purposed to keep the audience from viewing it. Track
One laws and regulations are intended to suppress messages that cause
harm or claim to cause harm.2°5 The record shows that the Baldwinsville
Central School District's hostility toward Antonio Peck's religious ex-
pression drove them to suppress and prevent Antonio's message from
being received.l If there is any freedom of expression right at all, it is
doubtful that the school district had any authority to suppress Antonio's
viewpoint. Assuming the persuasiveness of this analysis, Antonio and
other similarly situated students, nevertheless, should continue to see the
Second Circuit's opinion as an impermanent victory.
The provisional nature of the appellate court's holding is connected to
the fact that America sees itself as a liberal society. Coherent with
Stanley Fish's insight, for such societies, "'there's no such thing as free
speech.''2°7 Alexander explains:
In liberal societies, free speech is important because it is believed
to produce valuable consequences such as more truth, better de-
mocratic politics, and more individual self-development. But this
means that any freedom of speech principle carries with it a
commitment to constrain speech that destroys these things. Al-
201. Id. at 633 (quoting Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1325 (11th Cir. 1989)).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 633 & n.11.
205. ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 55-56.
206. See generally Baldwinsville, 426 F.3d at 629-33.
207. ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 178 (quoting STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH
THING AS FREE SPEECH, AND IT'S A GOOD THING, Too (1994)).
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ternatively put, a commitment to free speech necessarily carries
within it a commitment to censorship. 28
Thus, "[i]f free speech is only important because of its consequences,
those consequences that are valued and disvalued will necessarily reflect
partisan positions, not evaluative neutrality." 2°9 Properly understood,
individuals afflicted with the religious meme are likely to lose out in a
contest with prevailing liberal ideology. "[AIll possible curricula ... will
be partisan along some axis or another. Because we are finite beings,
with finite minds, finite attention, and finite time, our education must
perforce be selective. And the criteria of selection can never be neu-
tral. ''210 Despite the imprimatur of, and indeed, because of the imprima-
tur of Justice O'Connor's remarkable concurrence in Lynch v. Don-
nelly,21' it is likely that courts could discover grounds to allow "reason-
able" viewpoint discrimination of disfavored views. This is especially true
as they become more fully captivated by progressively more liberal norms
and cosmopolitan ideals. Grounds could include purportedly pedagogical
values, the possible harm inflicted by Antonio on others, or a possible
Establishment Clause violation. Such maneuvers may simply amount to
a government practice that communicates a non-incidental message of
government disapproval of religion or religious expression, which dimin-
ishes the status of religious adherents within our political community.
Equally likely, courts and other public officials will be increasingly called
upon to weigh the worth of the speech proffered by individuals in light of
the presumed harm. Public officials as initial responders to asserted vio-
lations of an inclusive consensus may find it necessary to discount the
value of individuals and groups who challenge the presumed consensus
on the meaning of life or the importance of the environment. Public offi-
cials armed with good intentions may place offending individuals and
groups outside the political community. As developed more fully below
in Part III, the courts have already shown the way.
E. The Road to Conciliation? Liberalism as Neutrality, or Liberalism as
Cosmopolitanism?
If America has failed to fully accept "[l]iberalism as a '[n]eutral'
[u]mbrella for [i]lliberal [resisting p]ersons, [a]ssociations, and
[c]ommunities," it is probable that America has instead accepted or is
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id at 168.
211. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("What is
crucial is that a government practice not have the effect of communicating a message of
government endorsement or disapproval of religion. It is only practices having that effect,
whether intentionally or unintentionally, that make religion relevant, in reality or public
perception, to status in the political community.").
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beginning to accept "[l]iberalism as [c]osmopolitanism., 21 2 "On this con-
ception, liberalism is not the above-the-fray values of a neutral umpire
but is rather a particular way of life, namely, that of the cosmopolitan.
21 3
Inevitably, "cosmopolitanism ... tends to homogenize and shallow out
the various ways of life [because i]f there are many paths to truth or sal-
vation, then little is at stake in finding a path., 214 Indeed, it is possible to
observe that we live in an era that has witnessed radically new perspec-
tives on human liberty and autonomy, which appear to correspond with
"[tihe bourgeois attempt to construct a rational alternative to tradi-
tion.'21 5 "[T]he Supreme Court has confirmed the correctness of this pos-
sibility. 2 16 On its account: "At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the
State., 217 This view provides an escarpment on which to demand and
create individual liberation and human singularity, the pursuit of which
appears consistent with liberalism as cosmopolitanism. This view may
imperil families and groups who, following T.S. Elliot, believe that the
creation of an enduring community and an enriching solidarity imply ad-
herence to "'the way of life of a particular people living together in one
place.' 21 8 J. Budziszewski counsels that a society that allows the notion
of radical autonomy to be taken too far will conclude inevitably:
[M]orality is created, not discovered, [and] then surely different
groups and individuals will create different moralities, for they
will 'care most' about different things. There will be no common
standard by which to adjudicate the conflicts among these in-
vented moralities. The clashes among them will be like clashes of
clothing styles, with this strange difference-that the stakes are
who lives and who dies.219
To be fair, "[l]iberal[ism as] cosmopolititanism... fits uneasily with the
American constitutional tradition, which, [appears to] line [up] with lib-
eralism as neutrality. 220 Liberalism as neutrality appears to provide pro-
tective cover for illiberal groups and disallow the exclusion of illiberal
212. See ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 165-70 (emphasis omitted).
213. Id. at 169.
214. Id.
215. SHANNON, supra note 11, at 203.
216. See Harry G. Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest: Infusing the Labor Union Dues
Dispute with First Amendment Values, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1309, 1343 (2006).
217. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
218. TERRY EAGLETON, THE IDEA OF CULTURE 112 (2000) (quoting T.S. ELIOT,
NOTES TOWARDS THE DEFINITION OF CULTURE 120 (1948)).
219. BUDZISZEWSKI, supra note 29, at 6-7.
220. ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 170.
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ways of life. 2 ' Still, contemporary Americans are captivated by post-
modernism22 and cosmopolitan values that undermine America's consti-
tutional tradition. This move may give rise to problems that limit the
likelihood of sustaining real diversity that allows illiberal groups to exist
in publicly meaningful ways for two related reasons. First, contemporary
liberalism as influenced by postmodemism runs the risk of falling prey
"to the 'fraternal conceit': the fanciful notion that community and social
solidarity can be secured ... [by compulsory] association." This move
is at peace with Christopher Shannon's understanding of the contrast
between classical liberals and contemporary ones.?' Classical liberals
perceived rationality as existing within the individual, whereas contempo-
rary liberals, despite their presumed thirst for individualism, see rational-
ity in the large institutions?'5 In the past, "[c]lassical liberals assumed a
world of small communities capable of generating public opinion to
which individuals could be held accountable." They "sought the auton-
omy of different institutional spheres such as religion, politics, and the
economy, yet modern America has seen a fusion of these spheres with
the rise of vast economic, political and military bureaucracies. ''221 Such
size inexorably implies compulsion as modem liberalism has replaced
deduction with command. "'Thus rights are no longer deduced, either
theologically or philosophically. They are proclaimed. Fiat has replaced
argument."' For contemporary or cosmopolitan liberals, operating as
paladins of "progress," the desired community and the preferred political
association lead inevitably to the necessity of mandating the conditions
under which school children can grow in a more or less homogenized
fashion. Evidently, growth such as this must be controlled by the state to
ensure independence from the traditions of the child's forbearers. Public
schools substitute homogeneity for actual diversity, and uniformity for
pluralism, to create a form of liberal hegemony that is justifiably fright-
ened by efforts to free public school students from the reach and central-
izing power of public school monopolies.2 9
221. Id.
222. See, e.g., Hutchison, supra note 216, at 1331-39 (discussing solidarity in the mirror
of growing postmodernism).
223. CHANDRAN KuKATHAS, THE FRATERNAL CONCEIT: INDIVIDUALIST VERSUS
COLLECTIVIST IDEAS OF COMMUNITY 2 (1991).
224. SHANNON, supra note 11, at 147.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 146.
227. Id. at 146-47.
228. PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, THE RIGHT QUESTIONS: TRUTH, MEANING & PUBLIC
DEBATE 165 (2002) (quoting Edward Skidelsky, A Liberal Tragedy, PROSPECT, Jan. 2002).
229. Hutchison, supra note 64, at 643-44 (discussing the centralizing impulse that is
connected to the common school movement).
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Second, "[r]eal cosmopolitanism is unstable and self-undermining. It
must domesticate and mute the diversity it celebrates. ' ' 3° Real cosmopol-
itanism "fosters the instrumentalization of every aspect of [human] life"
to serve society's ideal conception of autonomy. 3' Thus, many Ameri-
cans, and doubtlessly some courts, have been moved to accept "a shallow
homogeneity [that] supplants a richer, deeper, but more antagonistic di-
versity."' 2 This move places deeply held religious beliefs at risk and re-
quires suitable liberal language to command the exclusion of such beliefs
from certain places under certain conditions. Phrases like "no endorse-
ment" and inclusion, unsurprisingly, may offer constitutional cover to
remove purportedly illiberal views from the increasingly secularized and
desacralized public square, while allowing the courts and other public
officials to do politics in the name of conciliation. In addition, courts
have regularly deployed another strategy-name calling- accusing those
they wish to silence of evil motives, in order to justify government regula-
tions that they prefer, or to legitimize hostility to diverse practices that
they are inclined to disfavor.23 Taken together, this scenario is unlikely
to favor Antonio. Instead, he has reason to see his victory as merely pro-
visional. The next section explores the many dynamic moves that courts
have made, the reasons they offer, and the invention of language re-
quired to lubricate the exclusions they make.
III. EVOLVING STANDARDS OF CONCILIATION?
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Su-
preme Court stated:
The Court must take care to speak and act in ways that allow
people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for
them, as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with so-
cial and political pressures having, as such, no bearing on the
principled choices that the Court is obliged to make.2
Then, in a postmodern and highly predictable move, the Court assured us
that it was not bound by the plain meaning of it own words. The Court,
in responding to the political and social pressures, which it has dis-
avowed, assumed its role as national conciliator by commanding "the
contending sides of a national controversy [abortion] to end their na-
tional division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitu-
tion.""5 In another context, the Court, animated presumably by the need
230. ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 171.
231. SHANNON, supra note 11, at 202.
232. ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 170.
233. See Smith, supra note 1, at 19 (describing the Supreme Court deployment of the
"evil motives" strategy to silence those it opposes).
234. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,865-66 (1992).
235. Id. at 867.
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for "political compromises calculated to placate the major interested par-
ties, '' 236 engaged in its own peculiar form of politics that threatened to
place adherents to certain viewpoints at risk.2 7 This maneuver is predi-
cated on the Court's flexible understanding of evil motives that endanger
the national consensus. 28 This is not a surprising occurrence. Following
a well-known evolutionary pathway, most "[m]odern democratic states
have themselves become weapons in the war of all against all, as rival
interest groups compete with each other to capture government and use
it to seize and redistribute resources among themselves." 9 "These con-
flicts are not simply economic in origin." 24° Rather, the complete anthol-
ogy of political goods-including freedom of expression and the sanctity
of individual conscience241-is at risk. Martin Loughlin delivers a persua-
sive forecast: "The liberal-legalist order ...will be founded on self-
interested, rights-bearing, adversarial individuals and this will not be sus-
tainable. This type of social order is likely to aggravate precisely those
points of tension in society which any vibrant political process should aim
at alleviating., 242 Hence, law and politics have been arranged "to shape
the relationship between an individual's religious devotion and her par-
ticipation in the marketplace of essential public goods and services.,
243
Conscience, for example, has been "invoked to mandate access to essen-
tial goods on terms that maximize consumer autonomy, even at the cost
of negating the efficacy of providers' diametrically opposed con-
sciences." 244 The executive and legislative branches of government, as
well as the courts, often find it impossible to resist the impulse to take
sides and choose whose conscience ought to be favored245 despite the
hopeful possibility that "invoking the sanctity of [an individual's] con-
236. Smith, supra note 1, at 18 (discussing the Court's political compromises in the
affirmative action arena).
237. See id. at 20 (discussing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).
238. See id.
239. JoHN GRAY, POST-LIBERALISM: STUDIES IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 4(1993).
240. Hutchison, supra note 64, at 564.
241. See, e.g., Robert K. Vischer, The Sanctity of Conscience in an Age of School
Choice: Grounds for Skepticism 1-2 (Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law, Legal Studies Re-
search Paper Series, Working Paper No. 06-21, 2006), available at http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract~id=899381.
242. MARTIN LOUGHLIN, SWORD AND SCALES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS 5 (2000).
243. Vischer, supra note 241, at 1.
244. Id.
245. See id. at 2. See generally Williams v. Vidmar, 367 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (N.D. Cal.
2005) (involving a case where a teacher unsuccessfully sued a school district for discrimina-
tion because the school screened his curriculum for any inappropriate religious content).
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science can bolster [her] ... authority" in light of the "pronounced power
disparity in the state's favor. ' ' 4
The desire to have government take sides and choose whose conscience
ought to be favored is not entirely an American development. In Can-
ada, for instance, society's collective conscience has been summoned to
disqualify otherwise qualified teachers who come to the educational table
with a distinctly different moral compass -even when their moral beliefs
have no direct effect on their approach to teaching.247 Evidently, when
students and faculty agree to refrain from engaging in all non-biblical
sexual conduct as a matter of conscience inspired by religious devotion,
their statement of belief amounts to conduct that constitutes an act of
discrimination against homosexuals.248 This process renders their beliefs,
at least potentially, illegitimate. Whether such legal argumentation sus-
tains the conclusion that the Anglo-American constitutional system
"regularizes deception on a massive scale," 249 "[a]ll modern democracies,
but especially the United States, have transformed the state into an arena
of doctrinal conflicts, wherein.., contending political movements vie for
supremacy." ' 0 Surely courts have a role to play in alleviating such con-
flicts. The courts' ability to play a role has been made easier by the arri-
val of a postmodern era that challenges the existence or even the possibil-
ity of trustworthy "principles in either natural, moral, or political sci-
ence. '' 2i In assessing contending political movements, it is likely that
"[wie carry on practices begun in the Age of Reason, but without the
246. Vischer, supra note 241, at 3 ("If teachers and students are understood to operate
within a monolithic, unitary educational system, their claims to be empowered legally to
act (or not act) on conscience in the face of conflicting normative claims by the system are
not to be dismissed lightly.").
247. Trinity W. Univ. v. B.C. Coll. of Teachers, No. 27168, 2001 Can. Sup. Ct. LEXIS
32, at *22-27 (Can. 2001). In Trinity Western University, British Columbia College of
Teachers (BCCT) refused Trinity Western's application "to assume full responsibility for
[its] teacher education program" because the college required all students, faculty and staff
to refrain from engaging in all forms of sexual practices that are biblically condemned
including, but not limited to, homosexual conduct. Id. at *22-25. Agreeing to refrain from
engaging in non-biblical sexual practices was seen by the BCCT, the appropriate jurisdic-
tional unit, as discrimination against homosexuals. Id. at *25-27. The Supreme Court of
Canada decided that the BCCT's approach went too far. Id. at *66-72.
248. See id. at *66-71.
249. Robert F. Nagel, Lies and Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 605, 616 (1999).
250. GRAY, supra note 239, at 4.
251. OWEN, supra note 148, at 1. It is possible that:
[L]iberal institutions concerning religion-the separation of church and state, reli-
gious pluralism, religious freedom-were originally justified on the basis of a revolu-
tionary comprehensive philosophic doctrine, covering human nature, the purpose of
political society, and the proper domain of religious faith .... Today, belief in the
comprehensive philosophic teaching of the Enlightenment appears to lie in ruins ....
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confidence that our practices are moored to timeless principles. 2 ' Given
the absence of confidence in legal principles, one possibility commands
attention from courts committed to diminishing social strife: doing poli-
tics rather than law.z 3
The principal question becomes: what sort of politics? An alluring an-
swer materializes: whether obliged by the Constitution or their own set of
preferences that reify maneuvers aimed at eliminating, or at a minimum,
lubricating friction, the courts, aided by imaginative abstractions,24 or
alternatively, "opportunistic claims to authority, 2 55 perform the political
function of conciliation by ending division through compromise .2 6 Pre-
sumably, the Supreme Court, whether it is qualified for this role or not,
has paved the way.257 Charitably accepted, "these Justices see themselves
not as taking sides in the culture wars but rather as working to reconcile
the warring factions. ,28 As Hobbes might argue, things fall apart and so
the courts must keep them together.2 59 The Supreme Court, for example,
has often transmuted its desire to hold things together into a presumption
that religious strife is particularly debilitating for the nation.
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris supplies a fresh reminder of this inclina-
tion.260 A number of Justices appealed to empirical and consequentialist
considerations to make their case against school vouchers without provid-
ing a complete understanding of the history of religious strife or a percep-
tive understanding of consequentialism.26' As I have argued elsewhere, a
concern for religious strife premised on "empirical and consequentialist
considerations, in the [skillful] hands of Charles Taylor, might reflect the
nuanced deliberation that '[o]ur understanding of the place of religion in
a free society is bedeviled by our different understandings of freedom."' 262
By contrast, "holding things together," as interpreted by Justices Stevens,
Breyer, and Souter, obliges the Court to discard "evidence that 'the secu-
lar ideological wars of the twentieth century killed far more people than
252. Id.
253. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 1, at 17-18.
254. Nagel, supra note 249, at 606-07.
255. Id. at 609.
256. Smith, supra note 1, at 18.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 17.
259. Id.
260. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 686 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
261. For a discussion of the dissenting Justices' failings, see Hutchison, supra note 64,
at 622-30.
262. Id. at 623 (second alteration in original) (quoting Charles Taylor, Religion in a
Free Society, in ARTICLES OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE: THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY




all the religious wars of history combined."'263 Paradoxically, "secular
ideologies are not banned from the liberal public square because of their
dangers." '26 4  Nevertheless, the implication seems clear enough. The
Court must inescapably take sides in its selective examination of the evi-
dence and its selection of disfavored groups when fulfilling its role as our
national conciliator. As such, the courts offer their own moral compass,
which allows them to outlaw as illegitimate the moral compass of others
without so much as providing a principled basis for doing so. 26 Alasdair
Maclntyre suggests there is an interminable and unsettled character in
what passes for America's contemporary moral and philosophical de-
266bates. Yet, the courts in their role as conciliator often fail to reflect a
nuanced understanding of the marketplace of freedom, the disparate
conceptions of human autonomy available in contemporary society, and
the variety of heterogeneous and incommensurable concepts that inform
the major premises from which the protagonists in such debates argue.
2 6 7
To be sure, this approach may be consistent with two possibilities: (1)
seeing religion as some minor component of the exercise of "the 'right'
proclaimed as fundamental and 'at the heart of liberty,' in Planned Par-
enthood v. Casey... 'to define one's own concept of existence, of mean-
ing, of the universe, and the mystery of human life,'" or (2) accepting as
true, Ronald Dworkin's conception of the First Amendment's guarantee
of religious freedom as simply a proscription that allows one to decide for
himself.2 69 Either approach may lead inexorably to a world grounded in
"self-interested make-believe."7 0 In spite of the latter possibility, it is
likely that when confronted with heterogeneous beliefs and language, the
courts, for a number of reasons, incline toward the State's preferred un-
derstanding of human autonomy as opposed to the tradition and values
represented by resisting parents.7
263. Ld. at 624 (quoting Carter, supra note 43, at 52).
264. Carter, supra note 43, at 52.
265. See Lund & McGinnis, supra note 17, at 1584-85 (discussing the Supreme Court's
willingness to rule out-of-bound different moral judgment without providing any constitu-
tional justification).
266. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 226 (1981).
267. Cf. id.
268. Finnis, supra note 13, at 112 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 864 (1992)).
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. One possible reason for judicial discomfort is suggested by Stephen Carter. The
deployment of religious language in public debates provides something more than cacoph-
ony-it provides, at times, a basis for prevailing in such debates. Indeed, "Charles Taylor
argues that liberal uneasiness with strong religious commitments rests in large measure
upon this historical truth." Carter, supra note 43, at 38.
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By impressing school children into the fray, as the district court opinion
in Baldwinsville shows, courts contribute -inadvertently or deliber-
ately-to the battle of all against all while exacerbating the "corrosive,
irreconcilable, and proliferating conflict between government and fam-
ily., 272 The courts defend such incursions by steadfastly proclaiming their
commitment to compromise 7 and finding a reasonable balance, even at
the costs of declining to overrule prior cases that were wrongly decided.274
Thus, the Supreme Court contends that its commitment to such values
and its adherence to such motives are necessitated, "not for the sake of
the Court, but for the sake of the Nation."275  Ominously, such self-
portrayals threaten the return of Dred Scott, 2 76 and on one account,
amount to little more than "'an outpouring of self-important romance...
that brings to mind a "'late-night fit of drunken sentimentality.'
277
Complementing this move, courts regularly invoke the "no endorse-
ment" rationale. As we have seen, this contemporary theory suggests:
[M]essages of endorsement or disapproval of religion are imper-
missible because they cause some people to feel like outsiders or
"lesser members of the political community." The "no endorse-
ment" doctrine, which at least on its face prohibits both en-
dorsement and disapproval, and hence purports to protect both
believers and nonbelievers against offense, seeks to avoid such
alienation and so to hold all citizens together in full political
communion.y8
Of course, as Professor Steven Smith shows, "[f]aithfully applied, the 'no
endorsement' prohibition would render unconstitutional such landmarks
as the Declaration of Independence, Lincoln's Second Inaugural Ad-
dress, and, ironically, Jefferson's famous 'Virginia Statute for Religious
Freedom." '279 However honorable its purpose, the "no endorsement" test
remains "hopelessly indeterminate."m
If the Supreme Court counts as a reasonable observer, it is possible that
the "no endorsement" test amounts simply to the Court's own version of
272. STEPHEN ARONS, COMPELLING BELIEF: THE CULTURE OF AMERICAN
SCHOOLING, at vii (1983).
273. Smith, supra note 1, at 18.
274. Casey, 505 U.S. at 864.
275. Id. at 868.
276. Evidently Dred Scott is "the leading precedent for [such] self-portrayal[s]." Smith,
supra note 1, at 18. "[T]he Supreme Court... attempted to call the contending sides of a
national controversy to end their national division .... Four years later the nation was
engaged in a civil war." Id.
277. Id. (citations omitted).
278. Id. at 17.
279. Id.




the politics of fear 8' grounded in the notion of "'putting cruelty first,"'
and thus articulating from what we most want to escape.m This move is
complemented by ascription. The Court ascribes bad motives to those
groups and individuals who sustain the controversy in ways the Court
dislikes.23  The search for bad motives operates dependably with the
claim that courts have an expanding political role in alleviating conflict
through appeals to conciliation and inclusion.2 Whether the theme of
conciliation operates as a form of shared social "consensus for perpetu-
ally controversial principles, '" or instead amounts to the predominant
opinion of a society that "inevitably reflect[s] the views of the social and
intellectual elites who have the greatest access to public modes of expres-
sion,"2 6 it will likely survive the retirement of the Supreme Court's most
consistent proponent of conciliation, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor.2
7
Whether truly driven by conciliation or other values, it is probable that
actual adjudication simply articulates congeries including "play[ing] in
the joints," the deduction that religious speech is entitled to less protec-
tion than other kinds of expression, 9 or the State's philosophical prefer-
ence requiring discrimination against religious beliefs.29 While these
281. Bernard Yack, Introduction to LIBERALISM WITHOUT ILLUSIONS 1, 2 (Bernard
Yack ed., 1996) (discussing the "liberalism of fear" that is "reinforced by the extraordinary
violence and irrationality of politics in twentieth-century Europe").
282. Michael Walzer, On Negative Politics, in LIBERALISM WITHOUT ILLUSIONS,
supra note 281, at 17, 17 (discussing Judith Shklar's politics).
283. Smith, supra note 1, at 19.
284. See id. at 18.
285. Yack, supra note 281, at 8.
286. Id. at 8-9; see also Nagel, supra note 249, at 610-11 (describing the Yale argument
used in constitutional adjudication as an exercise in superior effort, skill, or intelligence
leading to a claim of authority from effort). For instance, members of the philosophical
elites, such as Ronald Dworkin, present themselves as "having thought harder than the
Pope about Catholic theology." Id. at 610.
287. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In
particular, Justice O'Connor concentrates on whether a challenged government practice
contributes to political divisiveness, but concludes that the Supreme Court has "never
relied on divisiveness as an independent ground for holding a government practice uncon-
stitutional," but then goes on to assert that "the constitutional inquiry should focus ulti-
mately on the character of the government activity that might cause such divisiveness, not
on the divisiveness itself." Id. at 689. Ultimately, Justice O'Connor asserts, "[w]hat is
crucial is that a government practice not have the effect of communicating a message of
government endorsement or disapproval of religion. It is only practices having that effect,
whether intentionally or unintentionally, that make religion relevant, in reality or public
perception, to status in the political community." Id. at 692.
288. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970); see also Locke v.
Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004) ("If any room exists between the two Religion Clauses, it
must be here.").
289. See Chess v. Widmar, 480 F. Supp. 907, 918 (W.D. Mo. 1979), remanded, 635 F.2d
1310 (8th Cir. 1980), affd sub. nom. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
290. Locke, 540 U.S. at 730 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ideas have all become part of America's uncertain constitutional lexicon,
the invocation of such concepts leads inescapably to judgment concerning
the relative merits of competing ideas as well as the relative worth of hu-
man subjects.29'
Chantal Delsol provides this gloomy account of one postmodern-
cosmopolitan worldview that may place at risk those who hold contrast-
ing views:
Simultaneously with the rejection of any idea of the objective
good, a discourse of the obligatory good has developed.... We
feel that we must share. Similarly, we are under an obligation to
protect the earth. No one can defend the destruction of the envi-
ronment or manifest his indifference to such destruction.... The
mandatory discourse about objective good... seeks its justifica-
tions in vain, for why must we show solidarity with our contem-
poraries, or even, according to the environmentalist discourse,
with future generations.
However incoherent this postmodern discourse may appear, if this view is
mandated in public schools because it is deemed essential to the survival
of liberal society, religious students who hold opposing views may be re-
quired to accept this view or risk rejection and vilification.
Progress as an ambition may supply a nimble and adaptable justifica-
tion that complements such developments. Concepts such as inclusion or
conciliation carry with them the presumption that such inventions are
necessary for progress, or necessary to preclude actors with suspect mo-
tives from disrupting America's social consensus. These arguments may
commence, as Robert Nagel shows, with the best of intentions- "the de-
sire to improve the world. But as the political scientist Rogers Smith and
others have pointed out, in order to mandate progress in the name of law,
especially in the name of constitutional law, it [may be] necessary to de-
ceive." 293 Although "legal thinking and legal argumentation are not al-
ways or necessarily dishonest,"294 it is difficult to take seriously the Su-
preme Court's confident claim that "[t]he law knows no heresy, and is
committed to the support of no dogma."' 295 Conversely, when religious
liberty claims are decided on grounds of one version of liberal rhetoric-
wherein conciliation acts as a unifying ideal-courts attempt regularly to
291. In assessing human subjects, it is possible that the terms of any debate concerning
religious liberty are set, as philosopher Daniel Dennett clarifies by the "Brights" (includ-
ing the courts), while concurrently diminishing the worth of the "Dims" (the others). On
this point, see Crouch, supra note 1, at 46 (interviewing Robert George).
292. CHANTAL DELSOL, ICARUS FALLEN: THE SEARCH FOR MEANING IN AN
UNCERTAIN WORLD 54 (Robin Dick trans., 2003).
293. Nagel, supra note 249, at 611.
294. Id. at 606.
295. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679,728 (1871).
[Vol. 56:361
Shaming Kindergarteners
limit the reach of religion, premised on the conclusion that the govern-
ment must be neutral among competing moral and theological visions
while simultaneously and unfairly demanding that religion should be con-
fined to private life.96 Although not all lower courts or public officials
accept Supreme Court precedent as a rule that commands obedience, 29it
is true that if one accepts "the 'settlement function' of law, ' 28 then offi-
cials as a general matter "must obey the Constitution as it has been inter-
preted by the Supreme Court, even when they disagree with the Court's
interpretation."299 As such, most public officials must accept as binding or
persuasive authority, the notion of conciliation as a national goal.
Whether or not the rule of obedience to the Supreme Court "pro-
mote[s] social stability and enable[s] individuals to coordinate their ac-
tions in mutually beneficial ways,"3°° it is clear those words such as "inclu-
sion," "tolerance," and "conciliation," however progressive such words
may be, are characterized by elasticity. Since such words and phrases
have become part of the vocabulary of American jurisprudence, school
officials have become understandably confused about what constitutes
appropriate moral and legal norms, particularly when the dispute impli-
cates the Free Exercise or Establishment Clauses of the Constitution.301
Although constitutional concepts when applied to specific public school
regulations by well-socialized school officials are likely to produce confu-
296. See, e.g., Michael J. Sandel, Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?, in
ARTICLES OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE: THE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CLAUSES AND THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY, supra note 262, at 74, 74-92 (assessing liberal theory);
see also PEARCEY, supra note 147, at 99 (discussing dualism and how it "became secular-
ized, producing the modern dichotomies between public and private, fact and value").
297. See generally Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (revers-
ing, for the second time, the Second Circuit on the same issue (a weakly distinguishable
exclusion from school), despite the fact that the Supreme Court had reversed the Second
Circuit in an earlier case, Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District,
508 U.S. 384 (1993)). See ANN COULTER, GODLESS: THE CHURCH OF LIBERALISM 11-12
(2006).
298. See, e.g., Emily Sherwin, Ducking Dred Scott: A Response to Alexander and
Schauer, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 65, 65 (1998).
299. Id.
300. Id. (describing Alexander's and Schauer's claims).
301. Confusion is no doubt enhanced by the failure of the courts to distinguish clearly
whether they are considering Free Exercise Clause or Establishment Clause issues. See
Mary Harter Mitchell, Secularism in Public Education: The Constitutional Issues, 67 B.U.
L. REV. 603, 608 n.18 (1987). Disputed points include the contention that secularism is the
religion that public schools tend to promote in violation of the Establishment Clause. Id.
at 608. Another point of contention involves the claim that the law, lawyers, and judges
have been given over to secularistic ideology. Id. at 607; see also Torcaso v. Watkins, 376
U.S. 488,495 n.11 (1961) ("Among religions in this country which do not teach what would
generally be considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical
Culture, Secular Humanism and others.").
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sion, °2 given judicial precedents and the transaction costs imbalance that
favors public schools as opposed to individual dissenters, confusion can
be made more manageable by assiduously evaluating the worth of certain
words even at the costs of producing shame or scorn, even though admis-
sions of animosity toward religious practice remain rare.
The ongoing conflict between secularism and religion provides an illus-
tration. One observer states that "the law in our system of government is
peculiarly disqualified to adjudge the relative merits of [the debate con-
cerning] Secularism and 'traditional' religions."303 Indeed, case law exists
stating "that public schools 'may not establish a "religion of secularism"
in the sense of affirmatively opposing or showing hostility to religion.
'' 304
Reliably with this approach, it is unlikely that religious expression will
face explicit hostility-at least immediately. Doubtlessly, whatever regu-
latory regime contemporary American courts and officials adopt, will
likely be explained in benign terms. While the original purpose of a chal-
lenged rule or regulation in many cases may be benign3 5 it is possible
that "those singled out for disfavor can be forgiven for suspecting more
invidious forces at work." Thus, the singling out of kindergartners be-
cause of their expression of detestable views should not be surprising in
light of the escalating political role of courts in settling disputes through
the invocation of values, which find scant support within either the text or
presumed penumbras emanating from the Constitution. The Baldwins-
ville case provides a propitious opportunity to renew America's ongoing
conversation about the intersection of religious preferences, freedom of
expression, and the persistent efforts of public school officials to preclude
First Amendment issues from disrupting the educational hierarchy's
modest pedagogical achievements. 307 As applied, this effort may be seen
as a denial of equal treatment and may amount to the elision of "benevo-
lent motives shade[d] into indifference and ultimately into repression."' °8
302. One source of confusion arises because the concept of "[t]he separation of church
and state remains" even though its justification may remain insecure in light of "the demise
of liberal rationalism." OWEN, supra note 148, at 1.
303. Mitchell, supra note 301, at 605-06 (emphasis omitted).
304. Id. at 608 (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225
(1963)).
305. See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712,733 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
306. Id.
307. See generally JAY P. GREENE WITH GREG FORSTER & MARCUS A. WINTERS,
EDUCATION MYTHS: WHAT SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS WANT YOU TO BELIEVE
ABOUT OUR SCHOOLS-AND WHY IT ISN'T So 95-96 (2005) (describing the evidence
showing that far fewer students graduate from high school than many in the public be-
lieve); see also Adam Meyerson, Foreword to SAMUEL CASEY CARTER, No EXCUSES:
LESSONS FROM 21 HIGH-PERFORMING, HIGH-POVERTY SCHOOLS 1, 1 (2000) ("Fifty-
eight percent of low-income 4th graders cannot read, and 61 percent of low-income 8th
graders cannot do basic math.").
308. Locke, 540 U.S. at 734 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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In the gathering gloom, one observer notes that "liberal principles of
religious freedom and disestablishment and the presuppositions underly-
ing those principles are not self-evident, but in need of explanation.''
Equally true, "[r]eligious freedom is politically limited."3 ° Liberal prin-
ciples including the values of conciliation and inclusion "require investi-
gation and justification, even if we are predisposed to accept them as
just. ' .. Insofar as kindergarteners and their parents "take the justice of
liberal institutions for granted, [they] merely conform out of habitua-
tion. 31 2 Although it is possible that inclusion and conciliation are consis-
tent with liberalism's assertion that "sectarianism is none of its concern,"
this claim requires that liberal institutions must appear to keep their
hands off.3 In separating uniquely religious concerns from political
ones, liberalism must appear religiously neutral-but "[tihe appearance
of neutrality serves a nonneutral ... political end. 3 14 The question be-
comes whether such service is consistent with the Constitution or simply
judicial preferences that lead ultimately to neutrality against religion?
On one account, "Americans tend to think that any problem can be
solved and that progress is always possible. When these happy assump-
tions collide with facts, the temptation is great to reform the world by
reforming language."3 ' If the proper answer to the pending question is
simply judicial preferences, then creative argumentation may operate as a
cover that allows the courts to do politics while ascribing inferior motives
to disfavored individuals, groups, and proponents of disfavored political
positions. This approach sets the stage for public school officials to inter-
pret the "law" in ways that favor the State's creation of meaning while
protecting public schools from those kindergartners and others who are
"perceived to be fanatical, intolerant, or prejudiced., 31 6
By imposing its ambition -conciliation as an idealized construct-a
putatively liberal society demonstrates that contemporary "[1]iberalism is
... deeply paradoxical at its core. 3 17 As Larry Alexander shows, "the
freedoms that are emblematic of liberalism-the freedoms of expression,
religion, and association-all appear to require a governmental stance of
evaluative neutrality. ' '318 Thus, freedom of expression and freedom of
religion reserved only for people with whom the government agrees is
309. OWEN, supra note 148, at 166.
310. Id. (emphasis omitted).
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 168.
314. Id. at 169.
315. Nagel, supra note 249, at 615.
316. ld.
317. ALEXANDER, supra note 24, at 148.
318. Id.
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neither freedom of expression nor freedom of religion.319 To take this
claim seriously is "to recognize limitations in the liberal order, even radi-
cal limitations., 32 This "need not mean that liberalism should be con-
demned or rejected in the absence of a superior alternative,, 321 but as-
suming "the practical superiority of liberalism in our circumstances
should not induce us to ignore possible flaws in the liberal order's foun-
dations," purposes, and procedures. 22
IV. CONCLUSION
John Rawls articulates a perspective of public reason that
"excludes the religious by drawing the boundaries of public rea-
son so that comprehensive religious doctrines fall outside them
for the most part" or that the bifurcation of public and private
reason marginalizes those "for whom it is a matter of religious
conviction that they ought to strive for a religiously integrated ex-
istence."'23
The Rawlsian approach, if accepted as normative, lends itself to a kind of
stasis that frees the domain of expression from discomforting heterogene-
ity. Instead, the public square, premised on the postmodern celebration
of difference and diversity, is characterized correctly by a compulsory
convergence of views on important as opposed to trivial issues. Although
"[t]he histories of liberal political thought and revealed religion have
been inextricably intertwined since the birth of liberalism,, 32 4 liberalism
confronts an unavoidable problem: if our "'constitutional faith"' and our
liberal principles have become our "'civil religion,"' "the liberal state
cannot adjudicate rationally or impartially among the various faiths, as it
claims to do, if it itself rests on one of the competing faiths."3'2 Today, it
is possible to conclude that "the substantive liberties protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment are those recognized by the Bill of Rights,"3 26 so
that "[1]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt, ' 7 except when
religious liberty threatens a court-mandated compromise deemed neces-
sary for the survival of "liberal" society. This presents a paradox for ad-
vocates of compromise, conciliation, and tolerance because "a campaign
319. Id.
320. OWEN, supra note 148, at 166.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Joseph M. Knippenberg, Liberalism and Religion: The Case of Kant, 30 POL. SCI.
REVIEWER 58 (2001) (citations omitted).
324. Id.
325. OWEN, supra note 148, at 2. It is not obvious that Owen fully accepts the claim
that liberalism rests on faith. See generally id. at 2-14.
326. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992).
327. Id. at 844.
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on [civil religion's] behalf is an act of intolerance, an act likely to provoke
resistance and to multiply divisions among [and also within] the different
groups."3 8
In the past, of course, religious expression and religious groups could
take refuge in Supreme Court rulings that provided a protective umbrella
for putatively illiberal religions. This traditional view of liberalism as
neutrality is now under review. Today, the exclusion of religious views in
public school may be seen as justifiable and necessary in order to spur the
kind of human flourishing that exalts the individual self, human singular-
ity, and the necessity of human choice as society prepares for the advent
of the Age of Cosmopolitanism. Choice as the prolepsis - the present
anticipation-of the cosmopolitan era fails to capture everyone. Christi-
anity, for example, unlike liberalism, does not provide a vision of life
simply as a choice. Stephen Carter provides this account: "One does not
decide to be a Christian. One is called to be a Christian. '3 29 If this ac-
count is true, religious parents may respond to society's encroachment on
their worldview by asserting that a state which freezes out their aspira-
tions, religious expression and beliefs, and then demands that they send
their children to public schools that reify shame production "has no seri-
ous claim on [their] allegiance. ' ' 3 Predictably, the State will respond by
engaging in a political and juridical calculus that wrest "children from the
grasp of the religion of the parents, thus denying the putatively illiberal
religion the opportunity to extend itself into the future."
331
Courts and public officials as purveyors of "elite [cultural] values
332
can enforce society's embrace of liberalism by mandating the deployment
of postmodern language. "Ending division," "finding consensus," "find-
ing compromise," and "no endorsement" are all part of the pantheon of
phrases which are accessible to courts that are engaged in an unswerving
search for conciliation. Doing politics means putting those we wish to
exclude beyond the protection of the State by diminishing their worth as
humans and incapacitating their "divisive" expression, which presumably
poses a threat to the separation we crave. A society committed to the
magisterium of the liberal vision will find all that is needed to accomplish
this maneuver is to reform words.333
328. MICHAEL WALZER, ON TOLERATION 79 (1997).
329. Carter, supra note 43, at 48.
330. Id. at 53. Understood this way, society's central culture (bureaucratic or liberal
individualism) aims to marginalize those groups and individuals who affirm the tradition of
virtues. See MACINTYRE, supra note 266, at 223-24.
331. Carter, supra note 43, at 50.
332. Lund & McGinnis, supra note 17, at 1589 (discussing this concept of constitutional
adjudication).
333. Nagel, supra note 249, at 615.
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